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The judgment of the U.S Supreme Court in Bostock v Clayton Country, is a landmark
decision in protecting members of the LGBTQ community from employment
discrimination on the basis of their gender identity and sexual orientation.
Nevertheless, there are hurdles in the implementation of this judgment, particularly
in relation with the right to religious liberty and the right to association under the First
Amendment to the U.S Constitution. 
The petitioners in this case were fired due to their gender identity and sexual
orientation and therefore sued their employers under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, 1964. The employers defended their decision by arguing that terminating the
employment of a person because of their transgender status or sexuality is not
discrimination based on a protected trait under Title VII, since the statute only
mentions race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Justice Gorsuch, writing for
the majority, reasoned that discrimination against a homosexual or transgender
person is application of sex-based rules and therefore amounts to discriminatory
action on the basis of sex. If a female employee is attracted to a man and a male
employee is also attracted to a man, action against the latter but not against the
former is an imposition on a sex-based rule that those assigned as male at birth
must only be attracted towards a person of the opposite sex. Similarly, if a person is
discriminated for not abiding by the norms associated with the sex assigned to that
person at birth, that is a discrimination on the basis of sex.
The dissent rejected this notion by arguing that understanding of discrimination
based on sex at the time of enactment of Title VII, only included discrimination
against men or women, not sexual orientation or transgender status. The dissent
refuses to accept any nexus between the sex of a person and discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity or having a same-sex relationship.
Interestingly, on the question as to whether an employer who hires blacks and white
persons but discriminates against an employee for having an interracial relationship,
amounts to discrimination on the basis of race, Justice Alito in his dissent, answers
in the affirmative. He distinguishes discrimination against an interracial couple from
discrimination against those desiring or involved in a same-sex relationship, on the
ground that racial discrimination is historically rooted in subjugating a particular
race, unlike discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. However, in doing so,
he does not take into account decades, if not centuries, of subjugation of sexual
minorities throughout history and the enforcement of heterosexual norms through
acts of societal discrimination as well as state discrimination especially through the
criminalization and non-recognition of same-sex relations and other practices not
confirming to heterosexual norms.
Even though the judgment provides protection to LGBTQ persons from employment
discrimination, the ruling does have several challenges in its implementation. The
prime one which is recognized by the majority and the dissent is the test of how
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this statutory right will interact vis-à-vis the right to freedom of religion. Title VII itself
provides for an exemption to employment discrimination based on religious reasons
by certain entities. 42 U.S.C §2000e–1(a) allows religious corporations, associations,
educational institutions or societies, to hire individuals based on their religion. It is
possible that certain religious organizations may insist on an interpretation of their
religion which excludes people from the LGBTQ community, and it won’t be open to
the Courts to rule on which interpretation of a religion is accurate, as it would fall foul
of the doctrine of excessive entanglement with religion under the First Amendment. 
Furthermore, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993
(RFRA) to prevent the state from substantially burdening the free exercise of
religion of a person, except if the government can demonstrate that the state
action is in furtherance of a compelling state interest and that the action is the least
restrictive means of furthering such interest. Even though RFRA is not applicable
at the state level, numerous states have adopted variations of RFRA as state
statutes. In Burwell v Hobby Lobby, the U.S Supreme Court held that even religious
corporations can claim RFRA rights. Therefore, one of the major test case for
implementing Bostock would be whether a religious organization or corporation
can cite RFRA rights and the exemption clause, to avoid a Title VII violation if they
engage in employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In other
words, is there a narrowly tailored compelling state interest to force a religious
corporation or organization to employ someone in violation of their religious beliefs? 
It is also important to recognize that there is an additional hurdle for Bostock, in
relation to the right to association. There may be situations whereby a person is only
eligible for an employment position within an organization or association, if such
person is a member of the association. In NAACP v. Alabama, the U.S Supreme
Court had recognized that forming associations on common principles, missions or
goals, are themselves form of expression. Therefore, the First Amendment protects
the right to ‘expressive association.’ However, if the one of the central tenants of
an association is its condemnation of homosexuality, the question would arise
to whether the ratio in Bostock can force such associations to ignore the sexual
orientation of the employees or of prospective employees. 
In Boy Scouts of America v Dale, the U.S Supreme Court recognized the action
of the Boy Scouts leadership in removing an assistant scoutmaster for being gay,
as an exercise of the right to expressive association under the First Amendment,
because an association does not have to admit a person it does not desire,
especially if the person’s presence adversely affects the association’s right to
express a certain viewpoint. Even though the Scout Oath and Law did not expressly
condemn homosexuality, the Court deferred to the interpretation of the Scout
leaders that the mandate to be “morally straight” under their rules, is incompatible
with homosexuality. In one sense, the judgment incentivizes organizations and
associations to explicitly mention their discriminatory approaches and beliefs in their
mission statement or policies, so as to come under the protection of the doctrine of
expressive association. 
Title VII read with Bostock provides a statutory right against employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, whereas the right to expressive
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association is a constitutional right. The right to association is subject to restrictions
which serve compelling state interests and which are narrowly tailored, however
in Dale, the Court held that there is no compelling state interest to force an
association to accept members, in derogation of their expressive message.
Therefore, until Dale is overturned, associations which provide employment positions
which are linked to membership and which have a mission statement or policy
against employing members of the LGTBQ community, may be immune from the
impact of Bostock.
Bostock is undoubtedly a major step forward for the LGBTQ community, however
it is still a case of statutory interpretation and not a matter of constitutional
adjudication, and therefore has certain limitations. The way it may interact with other
statutory rights such as RFRA and the principles of the First Amendment will be an
important flashpoint in the judicial handling of the ongoing culture war in society. 
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